Quick answer: In Gudla Vanaja and others v. Assistant Commissioner (ST), Saroor Nagar-I Circle, pronounced on 30 September 2026, a Full Bench of the Telangana High Court (Aparesh Kumar Singh, C.J., N. Tukaramji and G.M. Mohiuddin, JJ.) held that show cause notices and adjudication orders under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are not nullities merely because the PDF available on the GST portal shows no physical or visible digital signature. Chapter XVIII (Demands and Recovery) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 requires electronic authentication through the common portal, not a visible signature in Forms GST DRC-01 or DRC-07. Uploading on the portal is service under Section 169(1)(d), and limitation runs from the date of upload. A notice or order carrying neither a Document Identification Number (DIN) nor a Reference Number (RFN) is, however, invalid. The Full Bench disapproved the contrary view in Bigleap Technologies.
Key Takeaways
- Forms do not override Rules. The signature block printed in Forms GST DRC-01 and DRC-07 does not make a visible signature a condition of validity for Chapter XVIII documents.
- Authentication happens inside the portal. The Court accepted the Goods and Services Tax Network’s (GSTN) evidence that an officer must sign with a digital signature certificate (DSC) before the portal generates the document.
- Service is complete on upload. Section 169(1)(d) of the Act, read with Section 13(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, fixes the date of upload as the date of receipt, and limitation for appeal runs from it.
- DIN or RFN remains mandatory. The absence of both makes the notice or order invalid.
- Telangana petitioners were given two weeks to appeal. Several other grounds were expressly left open.
1. Introduction
Few procedural objections have spread across GST litigation as quickly as the plea that a show cause notice or adjudication order is “unsigned”. The argument is simple. Forms GST DRC-01 (summary of the show cause notice) and GST DRC-07 (summary of the order) have a signature block. The PDF a taxpayer downloads from the portal often shows nothing in it. If the law requires a signature and none appears, the document, the argument runs, is void.
Two Division Benches of the Telangana High Court had accepted the argument in whole or in part. Another had treated the DRC-07 as a mere summary whose lack of signature caused no prejudice. A Division Bench hearing a further batch referred the question to a larger bench by an order dated 12 June 2026. The Full Bench heard counsel for the writ petitioners, the Advocate General for the State, the Additional Solicitor General for the GSTN, and standing counsel for the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC). It also watched a live demonstration of the portal’s working by GSTN officers.
The Full Bench answered the reference against the taxpayers. This article explains what was held, on which provisions, and for which proceedings. It then examines the reasoning, including where it is open to question, and sets out what the decision means for taxpayers and advisers holding unsigned documents. The decision is confined to Sections 73 and 74 proceedings and Chapter XVIII of the Rules. The Court said so, and left several other grounds open. Readers should not treat it as a general statement that signatures never matter in GST.
2. Case Summary and Background
The proceedings. The batch comprised writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution against show cause notices and orders-in-original passed under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) and its Telangana counterpart. The Court recorded (para 40) that the petitions “essentially relate to the adjudication proceedings under Sections 73 and 74”. The petitioners’ common case was that the notices and orders, as they appeared in the attachments to Forms DRC-01 and DRC-07, bore neither a physical nor a digital signature, and so were non est in law.
The conflicting decisions. The Division Bench in Silver Oak Villas LLP v. Assistant Commissioner (ST), reported at [2025] 137 GSTR 620 (Telangana), applied Rule 26(3) of the CGST Rules, which provides for notices and orders to be issued electronically with a digital signature certificate or e-signature, to orders under Section 73 or 74. Bigleap Technologies and Solutions Private Limited v. State of Telangana, [2025] 142 GSTR 608 (Telangana), decided on 28 February 2025, held that Rule 26(3) did not apply to Chapter XVIII, but also held that the Forms prescribed under Rule 142 required a signature, so that unsigned documents were invalid. It described the contrary view on DRC-07 as per incuriam. In Sahithi Marketers, the same bench that decided Bigleap held that DRC-07 is only a summary of the order and its lack of signature caused no prejudice (paras 143 to 146).
The petitioners’ case. Mr Karan Talwar led the petitioners. Their main submissions, as recorded, were that:
- authentication by signature was a statutory requirement, and a login to a DSC-enabled portal was not the same as affixing a signature to the document;
- Sections 3, 3A and 5 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Rules 4 and 5 of the Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000 require the signature to travel with the electronic record so that the recipient can verify it;
- DRC-01 and DRC-07 are not mere summaries, because DRC-07 quantifies tax, interest and penalty and creates the entry in the electronic liability ledger;
- uploading is not “tendering” under Section 169, and limitation could run only from actual retrieval; and
- the writ petitions were not barred by delay, because a non est document never triggers limitation.
Subsidiary pleas covered the absence of a DIN, the sequence of Section 61 scrutiny and Section 73 proceedings, the validity of Rule 142(1A) and Notification No. 79/2020-Central Tax dated 15 October 2020, and the “Additional Notices and Orders” tab on the portal.
The State and GSTN. The Advocate General, the Additional Solicitor General and CBIC’s counsel argued that Chapter XVIII uses the word “electronically” and prescribes no signature, that the Forms are subordinate to the Rules, that the document is generated only after the officer signs with the DSC, and that Section 160 of the CGST Act saves defects that leave a notice or order in substance in conformity with the Act. GSTN was impleaded at the Court’s instance. Its Vice President (Architecture) demonstrated the process live, and its counsel filed counter affidavits.
Holding. The Court answered the reference as follows (para 154): the show cause notices and orders electronically authenticated by the proper officer and uploaded on the common portal “are valid documents in the eye of law”; their upload amounts to service under Section 169(1)(d) of the CGST Act; the period of limitation runs from the date of upload; but absence of both DIN and RFN “would render it invalid”. Because the plea of unsigned documents had failed, the petitioners were given two weeks to file statutory appeals, with other grounds open to them (para 155). The Court made no order as to costs.
3. Legal Analysis
(a) The reference was properly made. The petitioners argued that the referral order identified no conflict. The Court rejected this (paras 33 to 39). Three Division Benches had taken different positions, and the earlier benches had not seen the GSTN’s evidence. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Usha Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 44, it held that when a Division Bench disagrees with an earlier Division Bench, the proper course is a reference to a larger bench.
(b) Forms are subservient to Rules. The core of the decision is a reading of Chapter XVIII of the CGST Rules. Rule 142 speaks of serving or uploading notices and summaries “electronically” in Forms such as DRC-01 and DRC-07 (paras 77 and 78). The Court contrasted the many other rules where the rule-maker has expressly required a signature, a digital signature or a signature “in the manner specified in Rule 26”, and concluded that the omission in Chapter XVIII was deliberate (paras 80 and 81). Rule 26(3) sits in Chapter III (Registration) and “cannot be borrowed or applied to Chapter XVIII” (para 79). That disposes of Silver Oak Villas, which had imported Rule 26(3) from registration cases.
On the printed signature block, the Court applied the settled principle that “Forms do not override legislation” (para 86), drawn from Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar, (1975) 45 Comp Cas 43, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264, and the Bombay High Court’s decision in CIT v. Apar Industries Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 516. A form prescribed by a delegate cannot add a condition of validity that the rule itself does not impose (paras 86 to 88). Bigleap had treated the word “shall” in Rule 142 as making the Form’s signature column mandatory. The Court held that this confused the Rule with the Form (para 146).
(c) Electronic authentication under the Information Technology Act. The Court then asked whether the documents were, in fact, authenticated. Using the GSTN’s affidavits and demonstration (paras 91 to 109), it described the process. An officer is onboarded after validation and holds a Class-3 DSC protected by a PIN. The officer logs in with the DSC, enters the notice or order particulars, and uses the “SIGN” command. The system then generates a hash of the record, applies the officer’s private key, stores an audit record, and notifies the taxpayer by email, SMS and portal alert. The PDF is a readable rendering of that signed record. The Court held that this satisfies Sections 3, 3A and 5 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, so that the record is authenticated and legally recognised as signed (paras 116 and 147).
The petitioners relied on Rule 5 of the Certifying Authorities Rules, under which the recipient verifies the signature by computing a fresh hash with the public key. The Court held that this rule is meant for open platforms, not a closed system. The common portal is accessible only to officers holding a DSC and to registered taxpayers with user credentials, and “[i]t is not a business to business digital infrastructure” (para 114). The Court also invoked the evidentiary presumptions attached to secure electronic records and official acts under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (para 115). The petitioners had pleaded no misuse, so the presumption stood. The Court said that “[o]nly in a case where a demonstrable abuse of the mechanism is made out by the aggrieved taxable person, can the regularity of such proceedings be questioned” (para 122).
(d) Service and limitation. Section 169(1)(d) allows service by “making it available on the common portal”. The Court held that the date of upload is the date of receipt, because the portal is the computer resource designated for the taxpayer under Section 13(2)(i) of the Information Technology Act (para 121). It expressly disagreed with the Allahabad High Court’s decision in Bambino Agro Industries Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh that making a document available on the portal is not “tendering” it. It reasoned that clause (d) is a distinct mode from the “giving or tendering” in clause (a). It also refused to borrow from Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 or Section 153 of the Customs Act, 1962, since each statute has its own service mechanism. Taxpayers must monitor the portal as a consequence of compliance duties under the Act (para 149). For notices uploaded on or after 16 January 2024, when the portal added a note explaining that adjudication notices appear under “Additional Notices and Orders”, the Court held that the taxpayer “cannot feign ignorance” (para 139). The position for notices uploaded before that date on that tab was left open (para 138).
(e) Section 160 and writ jurisdiction. The Court noted that adjudication proceedings cannot be invalidated by a defect in the visible signature, since they are in substance in conformity with the Act under Section 160(1), and that Section 160(2) bars challenges to service where the notice has been acted upon (para 121). Having held the documents valid, it applied Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681: the argument that a non est document does not attract limitation fell away, so the delay bar was attracted (para 123).
(f) DIN and RFN. CBIC Circular No. 249/06/2025-GST dated 9 June 2025 states that a communication generated through the portal that bears a verifiable RFN need not quote a DIN. The petitioners said it operated only prospectively. The Court held that the circular does not say that, and that the document must show “either the DIN number or RFN number” (para 126). Every impugned document in the batch bore one or the other (para 128).
(g) Issues left open. The Court declined to decide the Section 61 scrutiny sequence (para 131), compliance with Section 65 on audit (para 133), non-application of mind in issuing multiple notices (para 134), the proper officer for penalty under Section 122 (para 141), and the effect of Rule 142(1A), which the Court said was already governed by an earlier Division Bench decision (para 124).
(h) Survival after amendment, and regime. The batch concerned Sections 73 and 74. The text of Section 74 extracted by the Court states that it applies to determination of tax for periods up to Financial Year 2023-24, and Rule 142(5), as the Court set it out, also lists Section 74A. The reasoning turns on Chapter XVIII, Section 169 and the Information Technology Act, not on the text of Section 73 or 74, so it should transfer to Section 74A orders. That is an inference, and the Court did not decide the point. Nothing in the reasoning depends on earlier regimes; the Court compared the CGST scheme with the Income Tax Act and the Customs Act only to show the differences.
(i) A critique. The strongest part of the decision is the Rules analysis. The deliberate contrast between Chapter XVIII and other chapters, and the limited reach of Rule 26(3), are persuasive, and they restore coherence to a field where the word “signature” was being read across chapters.
The weaker part is the dependence on evidence that the earlier benches never saw and that the taxpayers could not test in the ordinary way. A demonstration and counter affidavits establish how the system should work. The petitioners’ practical complaint was that a taxpayer holding a PDF cannot verify who signed it, or when. The Court’s answer is that the taxpayer can access the same document within the portal. That answer is sound for the portal, but the PDF is used outside it, in appeals, before banks, and in court. The Court itself recorded that a clarification of 21 March 2024 had contemplated a visible digital signature on the PDF, which had not been implemented in the State Tax Department because of software issues (para 110). It also attributed State officers’ concessions that the documents were unsigned to “ignorance of the working of the GST system” (para 118). A visible, verifiable signature would answer the complaint at little cost, and the judgment encourages it.
There is also tension in holding the signature irrelevant while treating DIN or RFN as essential. The latter rests on a circular binding on the department under Section 168, not on the statute. The result is a rule of invalidity created by executive instruction, which sits oddly beside the Court’s insistence that Forms cannot add conditions of validity.
4. Practical Significance
For taxpayers with pending writs or appeals on this ground. In Telangana, the signature plea, standing alone, is now closed. Taxpayers who sat on it should note that the Court applied the Glaxo Smith Kline limitation bar and gave the batch only two weeks to appeal. A fresh plea should instead be built around facts: a document that carries neither DIN nor RFN, one that does not appear on the portal at all, or a demonstrable misuse of the officer’s DSC. The Court left room for the last, but the burden is on the taxpayer.
Check the document, not just the PDF. Advisers should verify, for each notice and order, that it appears on the portal under the taxpayer’s login, record the upload date, and check that a DIN or RFN is quoted. The RFN can be verified on the portal, a route described in the CBIC circular reproduced by the Court. The Court relied on the fact that the petitioners had brought nothing on record to show that the documents were obtained from anywhere other than the common portal (para 148); a document with no portal trace would stand differently.
Treat the date of upload as the trigger. Limitation for appeal and for compliance runs from upload. A taxpayer who does not check the portal regularly, including the “Additional Notices and Orders” tab, carries the risk. Calendars for responses and pre-deposit should be driven by the portal date, and the registered email address and mobile number kept current, because alerts go there.
Choice of remedy. The decision reinforces the position that where the only complaint is a formal one, the statutory appeal is the primary route, and a writ is available only for the exceptions recognised in settled law. Taxpayers should file the appeal in time, with the other grounds the Court left open (Section 61, Section 65, non-application of mind, proper officer for penalty) pleaded fully, instead of waiting for a writ outcome.
For the department. The decision strengthens the validity of the portal process, but it also invites tidier practice. A visible signature or verifiable stamp on the PDF would remove a recurring ground of challenge. Documents must carry a DIN or RFN, and orders issued through other channels will not enjoy the protection the Court gave to portal documents.
Outside Telangana. The decision binds only within Telangana. The Court noted similar conclusions from Gujarat and Delhi (Vishwa Enterprise, Radhe Enterprise and Swarn Cosmetics (India), which the State relied on), and it disagreed with the Allahabad High Court on service. Taxpayers elsewhere should look to their own High Court’s position, since the Allahabad view on service differs.
5. Conclusion
The Full Bench resolved a conflict that had unsettled adjudication proceedings in Telangana. Its answer rests on three steps: Chapter XVIII of the CGST Rules prescribes electronic authentication through the common portal and not a visible signature; the portal’s process meets the authentication standard of the Information Technology Act, 2000; and upload on the portal is service under Section 169(1)(d). The result is that the unsigned-document plea cannot, by itself, defeat a Section 73 or 74 demand, and the period for appeal runs from the date of upload.
The decision is narrower than its headline. It does not say a signature never matters in GST, it concerns Chapter XVIII documents, and it leaves open scrutiny, audit, proper-officer and prejudice arguments. It keeps DIN or RFN as a condition of validity. It also rests on a factual account of the portal that taxpayers will want to see supported by a verifiable signature on the document itself.
For practitioners, the lesson is practical. Check the portal, record the upload date, confirm the DIN or RFN, and file the appeal on time with every available ground. It is the governing view in Telangana and a reasoned authority elsewhere, and its reasoning on service sits uneasily with the Allahabad decision it disapproves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a GST show cause notice or order need a visible signature to be valid in Telangana? No, on this decision. For documents under Chapter XVIII of the CGST Rules, electronic authentication by the proper officer through the common portal is what the Rules require. The absence of a visible physical or digital signature on the PDF does not make a notice or order invalid.
When does limitation start for a notice or order uploaded on the GST portal? On the date of upload. The Full Bench held that uploading amounts to service under Section 169(1)(d) of the CGST Act and that receipt occurs under Section 13(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 when the record enters the common portal.
Is a notice or order without a DIN valid? It is valid only if it bears either a DIN or an RFN. The Court held that a document showing neither is invalid, and that the CBIC circular of 9 June 2025 on RFN is not limited to future documents.
Can a taxpayer still challenge a notice or order for procedural defects? Yes. The Court left open the sequence of Section 61 scrutiny and Section 73 proceedings, compliance with Section 65, non-application of mind and the proper officer for penalty. These must be raised before the appropriate forum, ordinarily the appellate authority.
Authorities and Legislation
Applied by the Court:
- Usha Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 44 (Supreme Court) — judicial discipline and reference to a larger bench.
- Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar, (1975) 45 Comp Cas 43 (Supreme Court) — forms are subservient to the legislation.
- Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., [1986] 59 Comp Cas 548 : (1986) 1 SCC 264 (Supreme Court) — as quoted in Apar Industries.
- CIT v. Apar Industries Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 516 (Bombay High Court).
- Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681 (Supreme Court) — delay in approaching the writ court.
Telangana High Court decisions considered:
- Silver Oak Villas LLP v. Assistant Commissioner (ST), [2025] 137 GSTR 620 (Telangana) — Rule 26(3) applied to orders under Sections 73 and 74.
- Bigleap Technologies and Solutions Private Limited v. State of Telangana, [2025] 142 GSTR 608 (Telangana) — the view that unsigned Chapter XVIII documents are invalid was held not to be the correct position of law.
- Sahithi Marketers — DRC-07 as a summary of the order (cited in the judgment; report not given in the text).
Cited by counsel and noticed or not accepted by the Court:
- M.M. Rubber and Company v. Deputy Director, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471; Kilasho Devi Burman v. CIT, (1996) 7 SCC 613; Baru Ram v. Prasanni, AIR 1959 SC 93; CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633; Union of India v. Harish Chandra Goswami, (1999) 4 SCC 575 — relied on for the proposition that an unsigned order lacks validity, or that a prescribed method excludes others.
- Bambino Agro Industries Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2025] 181 taxmann.com 888 (Allahabad High Court) — disagreed with on whether uploading is “tendering”.
- Ramani Suchit Malushte v. Union of India, [2023] 112 GSTR 149 (Bombay High Court) — a registration case, described in the judgment as the basis of Silver Oak Villas.
- Vishwa Enterprise v. State of Gujarat, Radhe Enterprise v. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax (Gujarat High Court) and Swarn Cosmetics (India) v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 16532/2025 decided on 31 October 2025 (Delhi High Court) — relied on by the State and the Additional Solicitor General.
Legislation and instruments:
- Sections 73, 74, 146, 160 and 169, Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — https://www.indiacode.nic.in/
- Rules 26 and 142 and Chapter XVIII, Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017
- Sections 3, 3A, 5 and 13, Information Technology Act, 2000
- Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000
- CBIC Circular No. 249/06/2025-GST dated 9 June 2025
- Judgment text: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140433973/
This article is not legal advice and does not create an attorney–client relationship. Readers should verify the certified copy of the judgment and any subsequent clarificatory orders before relying on it, and consult a qualified advocate on the facts of their matter.