Quick answer: In Elster Metering Private Limited v. The State of Maharashtra and others, Writ Petition No. 12273 of 2026, decided on 12 October 2026, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (M. S. Karnik and Sandesh D. Patil, JJ.; order by Karnik J.) quashed an appellate order that had rejected a GST appeal as time-barred. The adjudication order under Section 73(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 dated 29 August 2024 had been uploaded in the “Additional Notices and Orders” section of the GST portal, not the “View Notices and Orders” section. The appellate authority had treated the order as served because the company filed returns and paid tax on the same portal. The Court held that this “conflates the periodical filing of returns with knowledge of an order placed under a tab in which orders were not required to be placed”. Section 107(1) runs time from the date the decision is “communicated”, and the Court condoned the delay by mandamus, revived the appeal and directed the appellate authority to decide it. The Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the demand.
Key Takeaways
- The limitation clock in Section 107(1) starts on communication. The Court stressed that the sub-section prescribes three months “from the date of such decision communicated to such person”, and held that placing the order in a tab where it was not required to be placed is not communication (¶¶16–18).
- Portal habits are not proof of knowledge. Regular return filing and tax payment do not show that the taxpayer knew of an order hidden in the “Additional Notices and Orders” tab (¶18).
- A reasoned refusal is required. The appellate authority recorded the petitioner’s cause for delay but never discussed it, and the Court treated that as an independent defect (¶18).
- The writ route was open despite the Tribunal. The Court entertained the petition because the allegation was breach of natural justice, applying the principles in Godrej Sara Lee (¶13).
- The relief was narrow. The Court condoned the delay, quashed the appellate order and sent the appeal back. The adjudication order was left to be tested on the merits before the appellate authority (¶¶20–24).
- Weight. This is a Division Bench decision that follows an earlier Bombay High Court ruling, T. S. Lines India Pvt. Ltd., on the same portal issue. No neutral citation appears in the text of the order.
1. Introduction
A taxpayer who misses the statutory period for appeal usually loses the right to be heard on the merits. In GST, that period is short, three months under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act), with a limited power to condone a further delay. The consequence is that the date on which a taxpayer is taken to have received an order matters as much as the content of the order.
Orders under the CGST Act are now issued electronically. The common portal has more than one place where a notice or order can appear, and a taxpayer who looks in one tab may never see what has been placed in another. Elster Metering asks what this means for limitation. It decides that an order uploaded in the wrong section of the portal is not “communicated” in the sense that Section 107(1) requires, and that an appellate authority cannot cure the problem by pointing to the taxpayer’s general familiarity with the portal.
The case sits within a recurring GST pattern: a show cause notice, a demand confirmed with little discussion, a missed appeal period and a writ petition. The Bombay High Court’s answer is short and rests largely on its own earlier decision, but it is useful because it states the principle in terms of communication and knowledge and because it deals with the Tribunal objection that is routinely raised against such writs.
This article sets out the facts and the Court’s holding, analyses the reasoning and its limits, and then considers what taxpayers, advisers and the Department should take from it. Paragraph references are to the order.
2. Case summary and background
The parties. The petitioner, Elster Metering Private Limited of Pune, manufactures metering, flow measurement and control equipment, including gas-focused systems (¶3). The respondents were the State of Maharashtra, the Deputy Commissioner of State Tax (the adjudicating authority), the Joint Commissioner of State Tax (the appellate authority), the Commissioner of State Tax and the Union of India.
The supply and the discrepancy. On 13 March 2024 the adjudicating officer informed the petitioner by email of a discrepancy concerning an invoice dated 23 August 2019 for the supply of 6,288 gas meters to Mahanagar Gas Ltd., Thane, having a value of approximately Rs. 60,65,782. The output tax liability declared in GSTR-1 differed from the liability shown by e-way bill data (¶3). The petitioner replied by email on 21 and 22 March 2024, explaining that the goods travelled in two vehicles, that two e-way bills were therefore generated for a single supply, and that the whole invoice value was entered in each of them rather than being split between them (¶4).
The notices. The Department then issued, on the same discrepancy:
- a notice in Form GST ASMT-10 under Section 61 on 2 April 2024, answered by the petitioner on 5 May 2024 with documents (¶5);
- an intimation in Form GST DRC-01A under Section 73(5) on 15 May 2024, asking for payment by 30 May 2024 with interest (¶6); and
- a show cause notice under Section 73(1) on 31 May 2024, answered in Form GST DRC-06 on 1 July 2024 with the invoice, the e-way bills and the earlier correspondence (¶7).
The adjudication order. On 29 August 2024 the adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, interest and penalty under Section 73(9). The petitioner’s complaint was that no personal hearing was given under Section 75(4), and that the order reproduced the 1 July 2024 reply while concluding that no supporting documents had been submitted (¶¶8–9). The judgment does not state the amount of tax, interest or penalty confirmed, and this article does not supply one.
The upload. The petitioner said that the order had been uploaded under the “Additional Notices and Orders” section instead of the “View Notices and Orders” section, and that it learnt of the order only in February 2025 (¶10).
The appeal. The petitioner filed an appeal on 25 February 2025 with an application for condonation of delay. On 24 April 2025 the Joint Commissioner rejected the appeal as barred by limitation without examining the merits (¶11). The reasons recorded were that the cause shown was neither sufficient nor reasonable, that the notice and the order in Form GST DRC-07 had been properly served on the portal, and that the petitioner, having filed returns and paid taxes there, was “well aware of the portal details” (¶13).
The submissions. For the petitioner it was argued that the adjudication order was passed in breach of natural justice and that the appellate order ignored its contention about communication (¶2). For the State it was argued that the orders complied with natural justice and that the petitioner should approach the GST Appellate Tribunal (¶12).
The holding. The Court issued a writ of mandamus in terms of prayer (f), which asked for condonation of the delay in the appeal in Form GST APL-01 dated 25 February 2025 and revival of the appeal for decision on the merits after a personal hearing (¶21). It quashed the appellate order (¶22), directed the petitioner to appear before the appellate authority on 21 October 2026 at 11.00 a.m., and requested the authority to decide the appeal expeditiously (¶¶23–24).
3. Legal analysis
3.1 Alternative remedy
The State’s first objection was that the petitioner should go to the GST Appellate Tribunal. The Court said it was “inclined to entertain” the petition because the case was that the adjudicating and appellate orders were passed in breach of natural justice, and it referred to Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (AA), 2009 (236) E.L.T. 425 (S.C.), for the principles on when an alternative remedy does not bar Article 226 jurisdiction (¶13). The judgment does not set out those principles, and it does not examine which of them applied. It relies on the natural-justice allegation alone.
That is a thin basis for the discussion on its own, and it is worth noting what makes the case suitable for a writ. The challenge before the Court was to the appellate order, not to the demand. The question was whether the appellate authority had acted lawfully in refusing to hear the appeal, which is a jurisdictional question about the first stage of the statutory scheme, and the relief sent the matter back into that scheme instead of replacing it.
3.2 “Communicated” in Section 107(1)
The core of the decision is the Court’s treatment of Section 107(1). The sub-section gives three months “from the date of such decision communicated to such person” (¶16). The Court adopted the meaning of “communication” given in Harikisan v. The State of Maharashtra, 1962 AIR 911: the imparting of sufficient knowledge to the person affected to enable an effective representation. It noted that the same principle had been applied to limitation for a statutory remedy in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, and Collector of Central Excise v. M. M. Rubber and Co., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471, which hold that “the knowledge of the party affected by a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element” that must be satisfied before the decision binds that party for limitation (¶16).
The Court then applied this to the portal. The order was uploaded under “Additional Notices and Orders”, not “View Notices and Orders”, the section “where notices and orders are required to be placed and where a registered person would look for them” (¶17). The appellate authority had reasoned that the digital order was properly served and that regular return filing showed familiarity with the portal. The Court held that this reasoning “conflates the periodical filing of returns with knowledge of an order placed under a tab in which orders were not required to be placed, and it proceeds upon service in the abstract rather than upon communication, which is what section 107(1) requires” (¶18).
3.3 The earlier Bombay decision
The Court relied on T. S. Lines India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 15 Centax 273 (Bom.), which the petitioner cited and which the Court found to present “very much the same” fact situation (¶¶14–15). In that case the assessee was held not to have been aware of an order under Section 73 because it was not in the “View order and notice” section and was not emailed, and the order was quashed because the assessee had not been heard. The Court quoted its earlier statement that “no mistake can be attributed to the petitioner for not having noticed the Notice or the Order on the portal” and that all orders and notices were “required to be placed in the ‘View Notices and Orders’ window/portal” (¶17).
The Court added a second ground. The appellate authority’s order “does not disclose any reason for holding the cause shown by the petitioner to be insufficient”, and although the application for condonation stated the cause, “the same was not discussed at all” (¶18). That defect would have justified setting aside the order even if the portal point had not arisen.
3.4 The power of the appellate authority and of the Court
The Court referred to Tecnimont Private Limited v. State of Punjab, 2019 (29) G.S.T.L. 737 (S.C.), for the proposition that although an appellate authority may not have power to extend limitation, the High Court’s power under Article 226 is not curtailed (¶19). This explains the form of relief. The Court did not remit the question of condonation to an authority that might lack the power, but itself granted the mandamus condoning the delay and directed that the appeal be revived and decided on the merits (¶21).
3.5 What the Court left open
The judgment is careful about its limits. The petitioner argued that the adjudication order was “non est in law”. The Court said that it was “expressing no opinion” on the merits of the challenge to the adjudicating order, whether on breach of natural justice or otherwise, because an appeal was being revived (¶20). It therefore did not decide whether a personal hearing was required under Section 75(4) of the CGST Act, whether the adjudicating authority was right to say that documents had not been produced, or whether the e-way bill discrepancy supported a demand at all. It also did not make a finding on the date on which the petitioner in fact learnt of the order, and it did not rule that the order was never served.
3.6 A critique
The result is sound, and the central principle is persuasive. Limitation exists to give a party a fair period to act once the decision is known, and a rule that treats an order as communicated when it sits in an unexpected place would deprive Section 107(1) of that purpose. The Court’s point about conflating routine portal use with knowledge of a particular order is also right in logic: a taxpayer who files returns every month has no reason to look in a tab that is not meant to hold orders.
Three limits on the reasoning should still be noted.
First, the judgment does not identify the source of the rule that orders must be placed in the “View Notices and Orders” section. The Court says orders were “required to be placed” there (¶17), relying on its earlier decision, but it does not cite a provision or instruction. The principle that “communication” requires knowledge stands on its own authority, but a future litigant who wants to show breach of a procedural requirement will have to find its source. The Court also does not discuss the provision of the CGST Act that deals with service of notices and orders by making them available on the common portal, Section 169 of the CGST Act, which is background and not something the judgment considers.
Second, the Court did not make a factual finding that the petitioner learnt of the order only in February 2025. It recorded the petitioner’s case (¶10) and found the appellate reasoning defective. The distinction matters because a different appellate authority, on rehearing, could still reach a view on the date of knowledge. The Court’s direction to decide the appeal on the merits (¶21) suggests that delay is no longer in issue, but the judgment does not state this in terms.
Third, the reasoning depends on the Court’s finding that the order was uploaded in the wrong tab (¶17). The judgment does not discuss the evidence for that finding, and it does not say what the result would be where the Department can show that the taxpayer was told by email or by another route.
3.7 Statutory context and later developments
The decision concerns a Section 73 order, which applies to demands without fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression. By way of background only, and not something the judgment discusses, Section 74A was inserted into the CGST Act for demands relating to the financial year 2024-25 onwards, and Sections 73 and 74 continue to govern earlier periods. The invoice in this case is dated 23 August 2019, so the Section 73 framework applied. The reasoning on Section 107(1), however, concerns appeals against orders generally and does not depend on whether the order was made under Section 73.
4. Practical significance
Monitor every portal tab. The case helps a taxpayer who missed an order in the wrong tab, but it should not encourage inattention. The Court’s reasoning turned on a finding that the order was not placed where it was required to be placed. A taxpayer should check all sections of the portal regularly, including “Additional Notices and Orders”, and keep email addresses and mobile numbers on the registration up to date, because the Court contrasted the position where an order was neither in the right tab nor sent by email (¶14).
Keep proof of where and when the order appeared. A taxpayer who relies on this decision should preserve evidence of the date of discovery and the section in which the order was found, for example screenshots and the portal’s own notification history. The writ petition in this case rested on the taxpayer’s account (¶10), and a court that is shown contrary evidence may reach a different view.
Draft the condonation application with care. The Court faulted the appellate authority for not discussing the cause shown (¶18). An application under the proviso for delay should set out the date of knowledge, how knowledge arose, where the order was placed and why the taxpayer could not have known earlier. A reasoned application also makes any later challenge to a refusal more straightforward.
Reply with documents on the record. The adjudication order reproduced the petitioner’s reply, which recorded that documents were enclosed, and then rejected it for want of documents (¶9). The Court did not decide that point, but a taxpayer in the same position should list the enclosures in the reply, keep acknowledgements of upload and refer to them in any personal hearing.
Choice of remedy. A writ petition is not a substitute for the appeal. The Court sent the matter back to the first appellate authority and left the demand to be argued there (¶¶20–24). A taxpayer whose time is not in doubt should appeal. A taxpayer whose appeal has been rejected as late without any engagement with communication or with the cause shown has a stronger case for a writ, following this decision and Tecnimont.
The Department. Authorities should place orders in the “View Notices and Orders” section and send an email alert, and appellate authorities should address the reasons given for delay. A refusal that rests on the assessee’s general use of the portal is vulnerable.
Precedential weight. This is a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. It follows T. S. Lines, which is also Bombay authority. It binds authorities within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction and is persuasive elsewhere. No neutral citation appears in the text of the order, so cite the writ petition number and the date of the order.
5. Conclusion
Elster Metering is a short judgment with a clear principle. Section 107(1) of the CGST Act starts the period for appeal from the date the decision is communicated, and communication means that the person affected has enough knowledge to respond. An order uploaded in “Additional Notices and Orders”, rather than in the section where orders are required to be placed, does not meet that test merely because the taxpayer files returns on the same portal. The appellate authority’s refusal to condone delay was also defective because it did not discuss the cause shown.
The Court’s relief was measured. It condoned the delay itself, relying on the principle in Tecnimont that Article 226 is not curtailed by the appellate authority’s limits, revived the appeal and left the merits of the Section 73 demand, the personal hearing under Section 75(4) and the e-way bill discrepancy for the appellate authority to decide.
The decision does not cover every portal dispute. It does not identify the provision that fixes the location of orders, it does not decide when knowledge is proved, and it does not say what happens where the Department shows that other notice was given. It does give taxpayers a solid foundation where an order was hidden from view, and it reminds appellate authorities that limitation turns on what the taxpayer knew, not only on what the Department uploaded.
Authorities and Legislation
Applied or relied on by the Court:
- T. S. Lines India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 15 Centax 273 (Bom.) — order under Section 73 not available in the “View order and notice” section and not emailed; assessee not heard; order quashed; relied on as presenting the same fact situation (¶¶14–15, 17).
- Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (AA), 2009 (236) E.L.T. 425 (S.C.) — principles on when an alternative remedy does not bar jurisdiction under Article 226 (¶13).
- Harikisan v. The State of Maharashtra, 1962 AIR 911 — “communication” means imparting sufficient knowledge to enable an effective representation (¶16).
- Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 — same principle applied to limitation for a statutory remedy (¶16).
- Collector of Central Excise v. M. M. Rubber and Co., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471 — knowledge of the affected party, actual or constructive, is essential before a decision is binding for limitation (¶16).
- Tecnimont Private Limited v. State of Punjab, 2019 (29) G.S.T.L. 737 (S.C.) — appellate authority may lack power to extend limitation, but the High Court’s power under Article 226 is not curtailed (¶19).
Legislation considered:
- Sections 61, 73 and 107, Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the corresponding provisions of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — https://www.indiacode.nic.in/
- Section 75(4), Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (personal hearing; raised by the petitioner, not decided) — https://www.indiacode.nic.in/
- Article 226 of the Constitution of India — https://www.indiacode.nic.in/
Case record:
- Elster Metering Private Limited v. The State of Maharashtra through Government Pleader and others, Writ Petition No. 12273 of 2026, High Court of Judicature at Bombay, M. S. Karnik and Sandesh D. Patil, JJ., order dated 12 October 2026 — https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54622810/
This article is not legal advice and does not create an attorney–client relationship. Readers should verify the certified copy of the judgment and any subsequent clarificatory orders before relying on it, and consult a qualified advocate on the facts of their matter.